In WWII, several new theories of war were developed, most of which
are still in practice today. From the Blitzkrieg, essentially an
armored thrust designed to penetrate deep into the heart of the enemy
lines and create chaos in the rear area, to the idea of Strategic
Bombing, the idea of bombing civil infrastructure to reduce overall
military power, we still employ most of the ideas honed in the
conflagration that engulfed the world. The major problem is that we are
no longer fighting WWII. We have seen the severe weakness of the
standard playbook in recent years, and unfortunately have failed to
recognize and adapt to the changing realities the battlefield presents.
Take
the Blitz for instance. One could aptly call it a spear thrust,
because that's almost exactly what it is. The support, and the actual
fighting formations all move on the same roads at the same pace in the
same direction. When facing down a numerically superior force in a
defensive posture, the Blitz works quite well. However as we saw in
Iraq, sweeping aside a numerically superior force was almost laughably
easy but securing the areas we had gained was next to impossible with
the forces we had available. Many of the weapons and soldiers that
would ignite the insurgency were able to slip into the populace because
the US formations were not able to sweep and clear the towns like
Nassaryiah or Najaaf that they just swept through. When the insurgency
was finally upon the troops they had to go back and sweep and clear a
lot of the same towns that they'd fought through in the initial push.
Whole stockpiles of military munitions were left unguarded, and the
failure to provide order and prevent looting showed how totally
inequitably the generals had prepared for the Iraq War. One wonders how
many lives on both sides might have been saved if the ground commanders
had had both adequate forces, and the wherewithal to say that getting
to Baghdad in 30 days was less important than securing Iraq for the long
haul.
Then there's Strategic Bombing. Perhaps we should
have learned in the Korean War, when B-29 formations ran out of
significant targets within the first week, that Strategic Bombing
doesn't work if the enemy has no infrastructure. Advocates of Strategic
Bombing often point to WWII, in both Germany and Europe, and also to
Bosnia and Kosovo as proof positive that it can work. But
there were other factors that make it clear that it was more a
supporting factor than an actual causal one. For instance during one
night when Tokyo was hit with a massive incendiary strike over 100,000
people died, which is more than the combined total of deaths from both
atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But Tokyo wasn't the
only target hit. Yokohama, Nagoya, Kobe. . . really every major
Japanese city was almost leveled, as was nearly every German city. Even
the London Blitz in 1940 should make it clear that such bombing it not
entirely effective. It is true that such attacks did affect industry,
and thus have a supporting role in ending the war, but the
Germans had to be almost completely smashed from both sides, and the
Japanese had to have super-weapons dropped on them before they gave up.
Even the example of Kosovo is fundamentally flawed. True the bombing campaign did
have an effect, but not as great as we often try to make it sound like
it did. Did Milosevic step aside because American bombers were blowing
up his infrastructure with impunity, or was it because the US was
starting to mobilize ground forces? We may never know exactly, but it
raises enough of a question that we should not be so readily relying on
air strikes as the one stop shop for winning wars.
Perhaps
most of all the drone program should prove the inherent fallacy of
Strategic Bombing. Since there is no infrastructure of note for the
Taliban and al Qaeda who seem perfectly happy to "rough it" in what is
essentially early steel age conditions what targets are there left for
the roving war planes? People. There's just one slight problem here.
In simplest language we don't know who we're killing. We don't know
what we're hitting, and once the missile is launched there's really no
recalling it. True there are a ton of terrorists that have been killed,
but who else have we killed? Doctors? Engineers? Perhaps
even the very people that we might be able to use as assets against the
propaganda of the terrorists. Relying on Strategic Bombing in Pakistan,
Yemen, Afghanistan, and Libya have lead to the situation spinning out
of control, and the view from the top becoming even more confusing than
ever. We simply don't know whose doing what with whom and for what
purpose anymore.
Now with armed intervention in Syria
looking ever more likely it seems almost a foregone conclusion that it
will take the exact same route as the intervention in Libya. We have no
idea who the rebels are, and no way of gaining even a semblance of
control, but we will most likely use a series of low risk air strikes to
"help" the rebels. This will work *eventually* to weaken the Assad
forces and potentially even weaken Iranian influence in the region, or
it might backfire and create a chaotic churning mass of old rivalries
and hatreds that continue to churn for the next decade or more. The
fault lines in the Middle East are not solely along the borders of
Israel, but everywhere where there is more than one race, and Syria is
perhaps one of the most diverse ME nation. Arabs will kill Assyrians,
Kurds will kill Arabs, and throwing Persians or the half dozen other
ethnicity will only make it worse. That is to say nothing of
the rift between Sunni and Shi'a. Worse still, as we have seen in
Afghanistan, and Iraq, internal conflicts have a way of spilling over
into neighboring nations. The violence in Syria seems to be
corresponding with an uptick in the violence in Iraq.
Libya
was at least a stable state before the Qaddafi was targeted. Now the
Libyans don't even really have a semblance of order, it is controlled by
roving militias which might as well be the same as firing the police
forces of Chicago and turning it over to the Gangs. This is to say
nothing of the serious military hardware that was just left behind by
the Qaddafi regime. Surface to Air Missiles, (SAMs), anti-aircraft
artillery pieces, artillery shells, long range rockets, mortars. . . in
the hands of an army such things would be trivial and out dated even,
but in the hands of terrorists who neither recognize nor fight for any
state, unparallelled chaos could be wrought across the globe. This is
what is in store for us if we intervene in Syria as we did in Libya.
We
can no longer afford to kid ourselves that we can win a few wars
inexpensively but dropping a few "surgical" bombs in key places. Air
Power will always play a role in warfare for as long as we are able to
fly, but we can not pretend anymore that it is the be all end all. If
we are to intervene in Syria it will take an Army and Marine Corps that
we simply don't have anymore. If we intervene we will need ground
forces to secure the weapons left behind, and provide order during the
transition. With the looming draw downs due so sequestration, and the
cost of over a decade at war, sending any appreciable ground force into
Syria would strain the ground combat services nearly to the breaking
point. Worse still the Navy and Air Force would be unable to support
those troops as they too are looking at drastic cuts to their manpower
and capabilities.
In all honesty I can not see what anyone
hopes to gain by involvement in Syria. The same people who cited how
Iraq was an "Illegal War" seem to be pushing us towards Syria for might
the same reasons we got involved in Iraq. With Us influence on the wane
in the last five years, it would be doubtful how many allies we could
entice to such a venture. We could always "go it alone" but as I said
before we simply don't have the forces, or perhaps even more important
the political and popular will to do so. Unfortunately our President
has backed himself into a corner by talking about "red lines," and
issuing dire threats to the Assad regime. Now that it appears that
chemical weapons have in fact been used the US must intervene
or lose even more face and political clout internationally. The Drone
President can not simply whip out a few strikes from UAVs hold up some
dead terrorists and claim victory this time. As the Bard said; "Let us
talk of Graves, of worms, and Epitaphs. . . Let us sit upon the ground
and tell sad stories of the death of kings; How some have been depose;
some slain in war, some haunted by the ghosts of those they deposed."
2 comments:
I really enjoy your posts and I learn so much about military history that I feel I should know.
Former EMN3 from the late 90s
I'd like to buy you a beer sometime, I make my way to Morgantown every so often for work.
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